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Written evidence submitted by Professor Peter Murphy, Dr Peter Eckersley, Katarzyna Lakoma and 
Bernard Kofi Dom from Nottingham Business School, Nottingham Trent University   
This submission relates to the following key issues outlined in the terms of reference 
The Committee is inviting submissions on the scale and depth of financial sustainability issues within 
local authorities with the potential to lead to the issuing of S114 notices, including the effect of 
commercial investments and the impact of Covid-19, and the role of central government in helping 
councils avoid this outcome. In considering this question, submitters may wish to address: 
• Those issues likely to cause impact the financial sustainability of local authorities, 
specifically structural funding issues (including grant funding), commercial investment 
decisions and the impact of Covid-19; 
• The scale of the problem, including assessment of CIPFA’s resilience index; 
• The role of MHCLG, including oversight of the Prudential Framework, capitalisation and 
reform of the Public Works Loan Board (PWLB); 
• What measures could help to stop, or reduce the number of, further S114 notices being 
issued. 
Summary  
This submission provides evidence on all of the key issues outlined in the terms of reference. It exceeds 
3000 words and is summarised as follows. 
There are increasing numbers of long-term and complex financial challenges besetting local 
government, that if not addressed, will continue to make an increasing number of authorities 
financially unsustainable. Under current financial reporting arrangements this will lead to the issuing 
of more Section 114 Notices. 
The scale of the problem is significant, and the long-term unsustainability of local authority finances 
is fundamentally due to underlying structural issues in the collection, allocation and distribution of 
revenue raised to support local public service provision.  
Continuing to provide short term and piecemeal financial support on the basis of the system last 
revised in 2013 is increasingly inefficient and sub-optimal in terms of distribution, with all parts of the 
current model becoming demonstrably more regressive in terms of their impact.  
COVID-19 impacts and authorities’ involvement in risky commercial investments exacerbate and 
intensify this long-term problem and have accelerated the process, but neither are they the 
fundamental causes of these problems. 
There is a long-term need to re-establish a new regime for local authority financing that is fair and 
sustainable; that reflects the levels of need for local services and the ability of individual local areas to 
generate revenue. 
The implementation of the Redmond proposals for local audit, the adoption of CIPFA’s financial 
resilience index and the provisions of the Fair Funding Review will not resolve these fundamental 
issues on their own. A new local audit regime and a fairer distribution mechanism are both necessary, 
but not sufficient to generate long-term stability and a robust new regime.   
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A new regime will require significantly improved data and information, not least for the assessment 
of need, as the basis of calculating the future property tax component, and for the economic and 
efficient operation of the re-distributional mechanism.  
An improved and updated Resilience Index; changes to the oversight of the Prudential Framework, 
capitalisation and reform of the Public Works Loan Board are necessary in themselves and as part of 
a new local government financial regime. 
The submission that follows provides analysis and recommendations on each of these issues.  
1. Introduction  
In our evidence to the Committee in November following the announcement of the Spending Review 
for 2021/22, we submitted the view that whilst the reliance on annual budgeting was understandable 
given the dynamic crisis caused by COVID-19, the government  needs to introduce a longer-term, more 
fundamental change to local government finance arrangements for the post pandemic and post Brexit 
era (Murphy & Eckersley, 2020). This should move central-local relations onto a more stable and long-
term statutory footing, make the system more robust and transparent (including improving the data 
and information upon which decisions are based), and hence improve accountability. The new system 
should also incorporate periodic reviews of the key elements as part of its basic design. 
This evidence draws on our earlier submissions to the committee that identified the structural funding 
issues facing local authorities (Eckersley, Murphy & Ferry 2019) and discussed some authority’s 
commercial investment decisions (Murphy 2019a). In addition, it builds on our evidence to the 
Redmond Review on the inadequacy of local audit arrangements and the need for financial 
sustainability and financial resilience to replace the ‘going concern’ judgement which has been 
rendered “meaningless” in the local authority context (Redmond 2020, p. 50). It also includes 
consideration of the use of Section 114 notices and Public Interest Reports (Murphy & Lakoma 2020). 
Finally, it uses insights from interviews that we conducted with 11 councils between November 2020 
and January 2021 to gather their perceptions on financial resilience and sustainability. We stress that 
a Section 114 notice should be viewed as a (very) late distress signal that highlights financial problems 
within a local council, and the key issue to address revolves around the ability of an authority to set a 
sustainable (and therefore legal) budget in the first place, not the issuing of the Section 114 notice in 
and of itself. In this vein, we concur with the evidence that Sir Amyas Morse gave to the 2019 Spending 
Review inquiry, namely that “a combination of reduced funding and higher demand has meant that a 
growing number of single-tier and county authorities have not managed within their service budgets 
and have relied on reserves to balance their books. These trends are not financially sustainable over 
the medium term”. This was later confirmed in the NAO’s Departmental Overview for local authorities 
(NAO 2020b).  
In December 2020, the Institute for Fiscal Studies (Ogden & Phillips 2020) brought the analysis fully 
up to date when they assessed the 2021/22 Local Government Finance Statement (LGFS) plans for 
both core funding and top-ups for ongoing COVID-19 related costs. In simple terms, these sources all 
indicate that the scale of the problem is significant, will continue to increase and the number of 
councils under financial stress will almost inevitably rise.   
Commercial investment has become a controversial feature of local government finance in recent 
years, in particular the extent to which these investments are funded by borrowing. This  has  
stimulated debate around the extent to which local authorities should be undertaking this type of 
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activity to generate income in response to increasing service demand, reductions in government 
grants and restrictions on traditional sources of revenue.  
Low interest borrowing has led to a sharp increase in acquisitions of land and buildings using capital 
finance. Although relatively stable at between £800m and £1.1bn from 2012 to 2016, there has been 
a sharp rise since 2016/17, and this trend has continued. MHCLG’s statutory guidance and CIPFA’s 
recently updated Prudential Code are clear that authorities need to consider the long-term 
sustainability risk implicit in becoming too dependent on commercial income, or in taking out too 
much debt relative to net service expenditure. Issues arising from increased debt levels and the 
activities of wholly owned commercial enterprises have also featured prominently in the Public 
Interest Reports in Nottingham and Croydon (Grant Thornton 2020a, 2020b).  
Central government has encouraged councils to be innovative and become more entrepreneurial but 
borrowing in advance of need purely for commercial purposes is not consistent with the Code or with 
the guidance, and CIPFA have continually reiterated the need to ensure that such acquisitions are 
affordable, prudent and sustainable (CIPFA 2019).  
 
2. Issues affecting the financial sustainability of local authorities, specifically 
structural funding issues, commercial investment decisions and the impact of 
Covid-19; 
The main structural issues with the financial sustainability of local authorities have revolved around 
the following 
a. Revenue Collection: the form, nature and amount and level of certainty of revenue collection 
both national and local. Should revenue for local government be collected via taxes on income; 
or property (whether collected from owners or occupiers,) or local sales or tourism tax or a 
combination thereof?  
The fact that local government in the UK is not funded from the plurality of taxes is very unusual, 
particularly compared to other Western European countries (Kuhlmann and Bouckaert 2016). Tax 
raising to support local government spending in the UK is also exceptionally centralised (Ferry et al 
2015). The two major reviews of local government finance since 1914 (Layfield 1976, Lyons 2007) both 
took the view that the design of a system of local finance must depend on the nature of the 
relationship between central and local government and what local government is expected or 
empowered to provide. They then considered the fundamental options referred to above. We would 
very much wish to contribute to such a fundamental debate (and believe one is necessary), but we 
are assuming the committee’s intention is to adopt a narrower focus relating to the current structure 
and forms of revenue available for local government services.   
The current structure and forms of revenue for local government services are central government 
support to local authorities both capital and revenue (in the form of council government grant and 
borrowing allowances); the collection and redistribution of revenue from business rates; the levying 
of council tax and the ability to levy various fees and charges. The UK is also unusual in that a large 
share of this revenue comes from recurrent taxes on buildings (council tax and business rates).  
4 
 
It is widely reported and accepted that since 2011 (and prior to COVID-19 expenditure), the real level 
and proportion of central government grant that supports local government expenditure has 
significantly declined (National Audit Office 2018). In effect, central government has been collecting 
more money that it distributes, and it has significantly reduced funding for local government. Although 
there were large increases in local authority grant funding between 2000/2001 – 2010/2011, these 
have been wiped out over the last decade and there has been a fall in the funding that local 
government receives as a percentage of national income, by approximately 8% between 2000/2001 
and 2018/19 (Institute of Fiscal Studies 2019). Between 2010 and 2019, more money was being 
collected by HMG than redistributed because of the government’s policy aimed at national debt 
reduction. This policy reversed in 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic emergency. 
The amount of local government expenditure derived from locally raised revenue (council tax and 
business rates) has also reduced in real terms, although the more substantial fall in central grant 
funding means that this revenue now accounts for a greater proportion of overall income. The amount 
and the proportion of revenue raised from fees charges and other sources (including commercial 
operations) has also increased in both real terms and proportionately.  The analysis from the Institute 
of Fiscal Studies of the 2020 single year Spending Review (Ogden & Phillips 2020) indicates that all 
these trends are set to continue. All of these changes have had a regressive effect on local taxation.  
Multi-year Spending Reviews and indicative medium-term financial settlements were introduced to 
the UK in 1997 to facilitate more effective service and activity planning, for local authorities. However, 
the last two settlements (including that for 2021/22) have been single year settlements. In addition, 
the way in which spending reviews are conducted in the UK disadvantages local authorities, which are 
dependent on multiple central government departments. 
It should be noted that since the announcement of the closure of the Audit Commission in 2010, 
knowledge and understanding about local authority performance and value for money has 
significantly deteriorated, as has the assurance to be taken from the local audit process since 2013. 
The Redmond Review demonstrates, and the government accepts, that local audit is no longer fit for 
purpose (Redmond 2020, HMCLG 2020a).  
b. Revenue distribution: As well as being exceptionally centralised in terms of collection, central 
government exerts significant control over the amount of locally generated revenue (including 
VAT) and controls the re-distributive mechanism (usually referred to as ‘needs equalization 
process’). The latter is required to ensure the resources available to different local authorities 
is adjusted to avoid major inequalities in local service provision between communities.  
The basis of the redistributive mechanism has historically varied over time and for many years was 
reassessed annually. Since the 1970’s, it was to a degree based on the Index of Multiple Deprivation. 
However, since 2011, needs and resource equalisation has effectively been frozen, and significant 
changes to the needs and demands of local communities since that time have not been taken into 
account. The basis for collecting council tax is even more variable and inequitable, since collection is 
based on valuation bands established in 1993, which have never been comprehensively reviewed or 
extended, but merely adjusted when individual properties are sold and a new valuation is applied.   
Since 2011 there have been substantial demographic changes – the population has been growing and, 
more importantly, the parts of the population that rely on the services or have demand for the services 
that local government provides have been growing more quickly than the population as a whole. 
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(Murphy 2019). This has most obviously been seen in social services. Over the same period , the 
reductions in central government grant have fallen disproportionately heavily on higher spending 
authorities, because central government grant is based on needs, resources and equalization, and 
ring-fenced grants that funded specific initiatives or services (such as Sure Start centres or 
neighbourhood renewal) were either subsumed into the Revenue Support Grant or abolished 
altogether. 
The Committee will be aware that the ongoing ‘Fair Funding Review’ (Sandford 2020) that both central 
and local government are committed to progressing,  has agreed that population, deprivation, sparsity 
and special considerations will be reintroduced as the basic pillars of future needs assessment. This 
needs to be accompanied by significant improvements in the data and information on which decisions 
are taken. If a property tax is retained, then contemporary values of domestic properties should be 
used, and council tax bands extended. If business rates are retained (these are currently calculated on 
the basis of square footage of business floorspace), this should be recalculated on the basis or added 
value or alternatives that better reflect the contemporary nature and pattern of business and wealth 
accumulation.   
Another issue is that LG Financial Settlements do not attempt to identify how much funding councils 
need to provide a given level of services at a certain quality and at what efficiency they should be able 
to do that. They look at needs in an area relative to other areas. The key elements underlying the 
proposed new funding formula are: 
• A relative needs formula, including an area cost adjustment (relative needs will be 
measured via a ‘foundation formula’ plus a number of additional formulae that are 
service-specific); 
• A relative resources formula (using the council tax base and a single notional level of 
council tax, rather than actual local rates); 
• Transitional arrangements known as ‘damping’ to ensure individual authorities do not 
experience very significant changes at the date of transition, which would cause them 
to be unable to manage their budgets in the short term.   
As Sandford states “neither the Fair Funding Review nor business rate retention address the issue of 
how much funding should be made available to local authorities, nor do they address how this 
question should be answered…. There is no automatic link between the statutory duties faced by local 
authorities and the funding made available by the Government to enable them to carry out their duties” 
(Sandford 2020 pp. 23-24). 
A long-term fundamental review of local government finance and spending should address these 
broader issues, namely how much funding should be made available. This should be related to 
statutory duties, informed by an assessment of absolute, rather than relative need. It should utilize 
data and information that is collected together in a publicly accessible repository sufficient to measure 
individual authorities’ performance and spending against the needs of the authority’s area.  
Commercial investments  
Low interest borrowing has led to a sharp increase in councils’ acquisition of land and buildings using 
capital finance. Although relatively stable at between £800m and £1.1bn from 2012 to 2016, there has 
been a sharp rise since 2016/17, and this trend continues. In 2018 the NAO were sufficiently 
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concerned to examine whether MCHLG’s framework on investment in commercial property was 
sufficient to ensure the financial sustainability of local authorities. In October, Plymouth City 
Council agreed the first interest rate swap deal in almost 30 years (Rudgewick, 2020), after a High 
Court ruled that the 2011 Localism Act overrides a previous court decision that banned the practice. 
It allows the council to convert a proportion of its short-dated variable rate loans into fixed borrowing. 
MHCLG issues statutory guidance and CIPFA recently updated the Prudential Code, which makes it 
clear that authorities need to consider the long-term sustainability risk implicit in becoming too 
dependent on commercial income, or in taking out too much debt relative to net service expenditure. 
However, in July 2020 the Public Accounts Committee issued a report that accused MHCLG of being 
too complacent about local authority’s risky commercial property investments and extreme levels of 
debt: “The actions taken by the Department to address risky and non-compliant behaviour have been 
too little and too late….and … demonstrate that the ‘soft’ approach of guidance changes has failed” 
(PAC 2020).  
The Public Accounts Committee would like to see the development and rapid deployment of 
‘interventions that target extreme risk taking’. While the Redmond review of local audit might include 
helpful recommendations it also called for “a wider package of changes, rather than relying primarily 
on (post-Redmond) external audit to address failings in the local governance of commercial 
investment activities” (PAC 2020). The government subsequently agreed with the committee’s 
recommendation (HM Treasury Minutes 2020). 
There are two main categories of local authority commercialisation: 
• Investment in commercial property, usually through the general fund; and  
• Investment in wholly owned companies set up using the “general power of competence”. 
Although the NAO and PAC reports relate to investments in commercial property, their concerns about 
increased risks are equally applicable to both categories. 
Redmond noted that neither CIPFA’s Pillars of Financial Resilience nor the Financial Management Code 
explicitly cover the impact of commercial activity on a local authority’s financial resilience. General 
fund investments should be considered as part of the audit of financial accounts but wholly owned 
companies would only be considered if material enough to be consolidated into the accounts. He 
noted an additional risk from a potential lack of transparency in the governance of wholly owned 
companies.  
Redmond recommended that the scope of audit should include a substantive test of a local authority’s 
financial resilience and sustainability. This clearly must include wholly owned companies and 
investments in commercial property. Issues arising from the activities of wholly owned commercial 
enterprises featured prominently in the Public Interest Reports issued to Nottingham City Council and 
to the London Borough of Croydon.  
MHCLG’s response to Redmond (MHCLG 2020a) grouped its response into five areas, two of which are 
relevant to this review. In relation to the recommendations for:  
• enhancing the functioning of local audit, and the governance for responding to its finding, and 
• improving transparency of local authorities’ accounts to the public,  
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the department agreed with the recommendations and agreed to work with the LGA, the NAO and 
CIPFA to deliver the recommendations. Thus, the reporting of both commercial investment and the 
accounts of wholly or substantially owned companies should form parts of the publicly reported 
accounts of local authorities.  This does not however obviate the need for the development and rapid 
deployment of proactive ‘interventions that target extreme risk taking’ as recommended by the Public 
Accounts Committee, which we support. 
COVID-19  
In November 2020, prior to the LGFS announcing plans for council funding that included the top-ups 
for ongoing COVID-19 related costs, the professional accounting press reported that around 100 
councils were in confidential discussions with the government, as COVID related expenditure and loss 
of income (from rents, council tax and commercial operations) threatened the statutory requirement 
of local authorities to set a balanced budget (AAT 2020). It was at this time that the possibility of 
numerous Section 114 notices became apparent. CIPFA identified three groups of councils most at 
risk: 
• those dependant on significant commercial income including airports, such as Luton and 
Manchester   
• Councils with low reserves 
• Councils most reliant on sales, fees and charges (e.g. Coastal councils and districts)   
MHCLG is carrying out a data collection to gather information on the impact COVID-19 is having on 
local authority finances. Information has been collected from local authorities in 8 rounds in April, 
May, June, July, August, September, October and it was last updated in December. The collection is 
being run on a regular basis while the government’s response to the pandemic is ongoing. This data 
shows councils’ COVID-19-related additional expenditure, income loss and allocation of the 
government emergency funding, as well as estimations of the full year impact. The Institute for Fiscal 
Studies in its analysis of the LGFS suggests  
“The extra COVID-19 funding being provided for next year does not look unreasonable if the 
impacts of the pandemic largely recede by summer as the vaccination programme rolls out 
and warm weather returns.  If impacts persist though, additional funding may be needed, 
and in this case, the government could call on its £21 billion COVID-19 reserve”         
(Ogden & Phillips 2020, p.1). 
However,  they warn that there is potential for longer-run and indirect impacts, which in addition to 
pre-existing demand and cost pressures will further widen the funding gap for local councils “unless 
there are continued large increases in council tax and/or additional funding is allocated or devolved 
to councils”.   
The case for sufficient and sustainable funding for local services was clear prior to COVID-19, but the 
pandemic heightened the need for long term stability and certainty in core funding and the need for 
greater in-year flexibility. Councils have to respond rapidly and “denying them funding certainty 
undermines their capacity to respond to fast-moving events.” It also results in sub-optimal decision 
making, because they have fewer resources to gather and make sense of the multiple sources of 





3. The scale of the problem, including assessment of CIPFA’s resilience index 
The scale of the potential problems is shown by the increasing numbers of councils having difficulty 
closing their accounts and the numbers who were in confidential discussions with the government 
about the potential challenges to setting a legal budget for 2021/22. However, the form of current 
local government accounts does not allow us to make an accurate assessment of the overall scale of 
the problem with any confidence. We do however know that the scale of the problem will increase 
(see section 1 above) unless there is a radical change in the system for funding local government and 
that will require legislation as well as resources.     
The financial resilience of local governments is also linked to their level of perceived vulnerability. 
Perceived vulnerability is the extent to which an organisation considers itself susceptible to shocks 
and uncertain events, to which it is expected to cope, adapt, or recover from using a bouncing back, 
bouncing forward, or a combination of both approaches. The perceived vulnerability of an 
organisation is controlled using the financial resilience dimensions as stipulated by Steccolini et al. 
(2015). Some academic commentators (Barbera et al. 2017, 2019) have found that organisations with 
high perceived vulnerability levels are more likely to adopt coping capacities, while those with lower 
vulnerability levels would apply more anticipatory capacities. On this note, we know this suggests one 
reason why local government organisations often adopt coping capacities, by using short-term 
resources to address long term financial and service pressures.  
Financial Resilience and CIPFA’s resilience index 
In Building Financial Resilience, CIPFA (2017) identified four ‘pillars’ or foundations of sound financial 
management and five indicators of financial stress. It then developed its Local Government Financial 
Resilience Index, which was launched in December 2019, although it continues to refine the tool. This 
is a comparative analytical tool that locates a council’s position against a range of measures associated 
with financial risk. It is intended to provide a clear understanding of possible areas of financial risk and 
allows comparisons with various groups of analysis. It is currently based on data from 2015/16 – 
2018/19 and can therefore help to identify trends. 
Redmond (2020) considers the pillars of financial resilience related to process and governance matters, 
so could be part of the auditor’s Value for Money opinion while the indicators of financial stress should 
be part of the risk assessment  Redmond notes that while CIPFA members must follow the code, 
neither the pillars nor the code have a statutory basis to ensure compliance.  Neither do they cover 
the impact of commercial activities on an authority’s finances. General fund investments should be 
considered as part of the audit of financial accounts but wholly owned companies would only be 
considered “if material enough to be consolidated into the accounts”. 
Notwithstanding the fact that it does not include commercial exposure in non-consolidated accounts, 
we have retrospectively applied the index inter alia to Nottingham and Croydon and compared them 
to their nearest neighbour authorities. Within its group of 16 authorities, Croydon has the highest risk 
in either three or four of the nine factors for each year between 2015/15 and 2018/19. Nottingham is 
placed first or second in three categories in its group in every year bar 2016/17, with a pronounced 
deterioration in the subsequent two years.  
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Assuming practice develops, as the new NAO Audit Code intends (2020a), we agree with CIPFA and 
the department  
• that the scope of local audit should include a substantive test of a local authority’s 
financial resilience and sustainability to test whether the body is planning effectively to 
continue to deliver its services or the way in which they would be delivered over the 
medium or longer time horizon (as in Scotland). 
• Auditors (internal and external) should use the CIPFA indicators of financial stress as a 
key element of the risk assessment. 
In addition, if it is not already doing so, CIPFA should be requested to extend their financial resilience 
index to include all appropriate commercial investments and wholly owned companies. All Section 
151 offices should also be required to report on an authority’s compliance with the CIPFA Financial 
Management Code and report on it in the Annual Governance Statement. Auditors should be required 
to report on any material breaches. 
We also agree with Redmond’s suggestion that the auditor should be required to critically assess and, 
in cases where significant risks are identified or emerging, test the CFO’s Section 25 report along with 
any other statutory reports or management estimates that have an impact on medium- or long-term 
financial resilience. This testing could include an assessment of whether there are clear plans for 
delivering savings, the usage rate for non-ringfenced revenue reserves and whether the local authority 
benchmarks its costs against nearest neighbours and takes appropriate action in response to variances, 
as set out in accordance with CIPFA’s Pillars of Financial Resilience”. 
CIPFAs Resilience Index is a relative comparative tool which ideally in the long-term should be 
supplemented by some absolute service benchmarks and costs. In our interviews with local authority 
finance managers, we found that some do use the tool and find it useful, although others prefer to 
rely on other internal tools to measure their financial sustainability and organisational resilience.  
Some local authorities also use the CIPFA resilience index as a tool to check the effectiveness of their 
locally generated tool. We would suggest that the CIPFA Resilience Index be modified to suit the needs 
of all local authorities in England and Wales. The tool needs to be reviewed to ensure more clarity to 
users, as the current guide looks brief and does not seem to capture a variety of functions within the 
dashboard. We believe that the tool will be much useful and useable if adjustments are made based 
on these recommendations. 
 
4. The role of MHCLG, including oversight of the Prudential Framework, capitalisation 
and reform of the Public Works Loan Board (PWLB). 
The terms and arrangements for borrowing are determined by HM Treasury and set out in the Lending 
Arrangements for PWLB loans. Interest rates for PWLB loans are also determined by HM Treasury in 
accordance with section 5 of the National Loans Act 1968. The interest rates are calculated and 
published by the Debt Management Office (DMO) on HM Treasury’s behalf in accordance with agreed 
procedures and methodologies set out in in a DMO Technical Note.  
Major local authorities may take out PWLB loans. Since 2004, under the prudential regime, major local 
authorities are responsible for their own financial decision making. They are free to finance capital 
projects by borrowing, provided they can afford to service their debts out of their revenues. In 
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deciding how much debt is affordable, authorities are required by law to "have regard" to the 
Prudential Code, published by CIPFA, but have discretion to decide how to fulfil this statutory 
requirement. 
The Public Accounts Committee argued that these arrangements are far too lax, and that the 
prudential framework has been impaired by the emergence of new initiatives in the sector, and now 
requires fundamental review (PAC 2016). In a subsequent report, it considered that MHCLG took 
“modest steps to improve data and strengthen its guidance after realising that there is an issue with 
the borrowing and investment behaviour in parts of the sector” (PAC 2020). Since 2016 these 
investments have increased 14-fold and the recent NAO report (2020b) showed 179 authorities 
purchased commercial property in the 3 years to 2018-19, with 49 authorities accounting for 80% of 
the investments. The NAO found significant numbers of acquisitions were for yield rather than service 
provision: £2.5 billion was for property outside of authorities’ own areas and up to £6 billion was 
financed by borrowing. The NAO also found instances where local authorities were not making 
Minimum Revenue Provision on their commercial property acquisitions. This borrowing should 
properly be reflected in current spending so that the costs of borrowing do not fall wholly on future 
council taxpayers. 
Local governance arrangements were not considered robust enough to monitor these investments 
with some authorities’ commercial investments not being properly transparent or subject to adequate 
scrutiny and challenge (NAO 2020). The Centre for Public Scrutiny told the committee that, in some 
councils, member governance has not caught up with commercial activity and a change in culture is 
required (PAC 2020). This view is highly resonant with the Public Interest Reports into Croydon and 
Nottingham. The Public Accounts Committee recommended that MHCLG should be more active in its 
oversight of the prudential framework and strike a better balance between supporting localism and 
ensuring that local authorities act within the frameworks that underpin local freedoms.  
The PAC recommended that MHCLG should work with CIPFA and sector stakeholder bodies, to 
undertake a thorough review of the prudential framework. This review should incorporate provisions 
to challenge behaviour in the sector, design effective interventions and improving the data held by 
the MHCLG. We support these recommendations.  
 
5. What measures could help to stop, or reduce the number of, further S114 notices 
being issued. 
A local authority’s Section 151 Officer (normally the Chief Finance Officer) has the personal power 
(and duty) to issue a Section 114 notice if they believe the authority is unable to set and implement a 
balanced budget. A section 114 notice effectively freezes spending other than statutory obligations, 
and the local authority may not incur new expenditure commitments. The Full Council must meet 
within 21 days to discuss the report although there is no provision for any action they must take. 
As Redmond succinctly put it  
“If a local authority mismanages its budgets over a number of years so that it is unable to 
recover its financial position, then central government has the choice of:  
• intervening under its “best value” powers,  
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• providing exceptional financial support,  
• facilitating an offer of leadership and governance support from elsewhere in the sector, 
or  
• using a mixture of these options.” 
Contrary to the implication in the committee’s terms of reference, the issuing of Section 114 is rare, 
as is the use of statutory intervention purely on the grounds of financial non-sustainability.  
Northamptonshire County Council in 2018 was the first statutory intervention primarily due to 
financial resilience issues, and the first issuing of two Section 114 notices, since Hackney in 2000. 
KPMG, the external auditor had provided earlier warnings about the issues that could trigger financial 
pressures, but these were not adequately considered in the councils decision-making process. 
“Even following the issue of the Section 114 notice in February 2018 and the KPMG Advisory 
Notice on the Budget also in February 2018, the Council still appears to struggle to take the 
necessary decisions at both member and officer level to control and restrain expenditure to 
remain within budget constraints.” (Caller 2018 p. 1). 
In 2018, KPMG (2018) warned NCC of potential “fraudulent revenue recognition” and identified a 
significant risk in the calculation of the Council’s Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP).  
“Since the audit plan was published, we have now identified the calculation of Minimum 
Revenue Provision (MRP) as a significant audit risk. The Authority is proposing to recalculate 
MRP to achieve a saving of £8 million in 2017/18.” (KPMG 2020 p. 7) 
In summary the two Section 114 issues at NCC were due to financial failures, poor financial 
management, poor leadership styles (skills), and corporate negligence. 
As we state in section 1 above, it was the possibility of numerous Section 114 notices that caused 
concern in 2020, not the actual number of notices issued. Croydon issued two notices in December 
2020 following the receipt of a Public Interest Report by their external auditors (Grant Thornton) in 
October and a further report from PricewaterhouseCoopers into Brick by Brick Croydon Ltd, (a wholly 
owned subsidiary); the local Growth Zone; Croydon Affordable Homes LLP, the Revolving Investment 
Fund and the Asset Investment Fund in November (PwC 2020). The PIR revealed that    
“Croydon (the Council) has experienced deteriorating financial resilience for a number of 
years with spending pressures within both children’s and adult social care and low levels of 
reserves which created a significant financial challenge in 2020/21, made worse by the 
additional financial pressures as a result of the pandemic.” (Grant Thornton 2020, p.2) 
On 16th December Croydon submitted a Renewal Plan to HMCLG and requested £150m of 
capitalisation loans, acknowledging that they will not be able to resolve the budget crisis without 
substantial support from the Government. 
Nottingham City’s expenditure has exceeded its budget since 2016/17, but despite regular warnings 
from the Section 151 Officer, it introduced short-term mitigation initiatives and a ‘high risk’ strategy 
of commercialisation rather than trying to reduce core expenditure and/or transform of service 
delivery. In August 2020, the External Auditors (Grant Thornton) issued a Public Interest Report 
ostensibly into Robin Hood Energy Ltd, a wholly owned company of the council, but the report also 
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indicated wider financial issues in the portfolio of commercial companies and in the council’s 
underlying financial health.  
In October 2020, MHCLG instigated a ‘rapid, non-statutory independent review’ (akin to a Best Value 
Review)  which concluded that “Nottingham City Council is not in a position to prepare and approve 
the legally required balanced budget for 2021/2022 without significant external support or the 
imposition of spending reductions, which would not be likely to deliver services that meet their 
statutory duties” (Caller 2020, p 2). Nottingham was at risk of issuing a Section 114 notice but never 
actually issued one. It did however formally agree with the conclusion of the review that it could not 
balance its budget without significant external support. In the circumstances the Secretary of State 
decided  
 “I am minded to agree that, on balance, Nottingham City Council should be able to respond 
to their challenges… This reflects the Leader and Chief Executive’s commitment to change 
and the fact that the necessary budget management work is now underway. However, it is 
clear that the Council will require significant and ongoing support.”  
(MHCLG 2020 p.1) 
The Secretary of State announced that he would appoint an external Improvement and Assurance 
Board and require a recovery plan to be submitted by January 2021, upon receipt of which he will 
consider the form and nature of future support necessary to balance the authority’s budget for 
2021/2022.    
It is the inability of an authority to set a sustainable (and therefore legal) budget that is the problem, 
not the issuing of the Section 114 notice. Section 114 notices can be considered as akin to a (very) late 
distress signal. At any stage during the audit, auditors can communicate on specific elements of the 
auditor’s work on the audited body, report in the public interest, or make written recommendations. 
However, evidence shows that they have been used relatively infrequently (PSAA 2019). As the NAO 
recommends,  
“the auditor should maintain regular communication with the audited body to ensure that 
emerging findings are raised on a timely basis in the form, and at the level within the 
audited body, that the auditor judges appropriate”.   
                                                                           (National Audit Office 2020a, p. 21) 
Like Public Interest Reports and auditor’s statutory recommendations, Section 114 notices are useful 
parts of the public assurance and financial investigation portfolio, as are statutory interventions based 
on part 3 of the Local Government Act 1999 (Best Value inspections). However, there are 
circumstances where some could be effective, but none are sufficient on their own to cover all 
relevant circumstances (Murphy 2019b).  The NAO have given a great deal more prominence to most 
of them in their latest Code of Audit Practice (NAO 2020a) but, given past experience and the 
proliferation of commercial involvements and hybridized governance arrangements involving local 
authorities, we think they need revitalizing and a more fundamental review. 
If new sustainable funding arrangements are established for local authorities in a multi-year spending 
review and Redmond’s recommendations in relation to enhancing the functioning of local audit, and 
the governance for responding to its finding, are implemented, then the circumstances which require 
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a Section 114 notice to be issued will decelerate rather than accelerate as they currently have the 
potential to do. 
In the absence of a general requirement, and where material risks (to financial resilience or value for 
money concerns) have been identified by external audit or the Section 151 officer, whichever body 
assumes responsibility for the overview of Local Audit should have the power to require a specific 
investigation and a more detailed report to identify specific Value for Money or financial resilience 
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